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Gerald R.Winslow, until recently a
professor of religion at Walla Walla
College and .author of the critically
acclaimed Triage and Justice: The
Ethics of Rationing Life-Saving Medical Resources (University of California
Press, 1982) as well as numerous
scholarly articles, joined LLU's Department of Christian Ethics effective September 1, 1987. At Loma Linda,
Winslow will teach students preparing
to enter one of the health professions
as well as undergraduate and
graduate students. He will also participate in the activities of the Center for
Christian Bioethics.
Educated at Walla Walla College
(B.A., 1967), Andrews University
(M.A., 1968) and Berkeley's Graduate
Theological Union (Ph.D., 1979),
Winslow began his career as a chaplain at Portland Adventist Hospital and
then served as Associate Dean of
Men at Walla Walla College. He subsequently taught ethics and religion
for seventeen years in Walla Walla's
school of theology, moving from instructor to professor. He has also
served as an adjunct professor at San
Francisco Theological Seminary, Newbold College, and Andrews University.
He
received
the
Distinguished
Teacher Award at Walla Walla College in 1974.
Winslow has received fellowships
from the National Endowment for the
Humanities, the Danforth Foundation,
and the Burlington-Northern Foundation. He has done post-doctoral study
at Cambridge, Virginia and Tubingen
Universities. In recent months, he has
lectured at the Universities of Texas,
Utah, and Florida as well as at Lawrence, Washington State and Gonzaga, He has also recently lectured at
numerous medical centers and hospital associations throughout the nation.
Winslow's publications focus upon
ethical issues in allocating scarce
medical resources. His writings also
explore topics as diverse as abortion,
the role of Scripture in making ethical
decisions and divorce. He is the au-

thor of the articles on "triage" and
"vegetarianism" in Westminster Press'
Dictionary of Christian Ethics. He
serves on the editorial board of Second Opinion: Health, Faith and Ethics ,
the journal of the Park Ridge Center
near Chicago.

Thompson Library
Opens September 25
Carolyn and Ralph Thompson, Jr.,
of Redlands, California were the honored guests at a September 25 reception that ' celebrated the opening of a
library named for their generosity. The
ribbon-cutting ceremony and meal
were held in the refurbished rooms of
Griggs Hall that will house the first
5,000 volumes of what will become
one of the nation's finest bioethics collections.
LLU president Norman J. Woods
thanked the Thompsons for their early
and continuing support. He also presented them with a copper plaque that
expresses gratitude to the Thompsons
"for their VISion, friendship and
generosity in assisting the Center and
establishing its library." Jack Provonsha, chairman of the Center's
Board of Directors, hung a duplicate
plaque on the new library's door.
Materials located in the Thompson
Library will be referenced in the university's Del Webb Library. Its staff
will acquire and catalogue the mater'ials the Center finances and houses,
thanks to a. cooperative agreement
proposed by Maynard Lowry, director
of LLU's libraries at Loma Linda and
Riverside.
Carolyn Thompson, a nurse, is the
president of a real estate development .
company in San Bernardino. She has
been an enthusiastic and effective
member of the Board of Directors
since its inception. Ralph Thomson,
Jr. is a surgeon at LLU's medical center and a professor in its medical
school. The Thompsons are avid
travelers and bibliophiles.

Anencephalic Infants as Organ Donors:
. Ethical Issues ·
.
On October 16, a transplantation team at Loma Unda led by surgeons Leonard Bailey and John Jacobsen transplanted a heart from a brain dead
anencephalic infant into Baby Paul who had been delivered by Caesarean section by obstetrician E1mar Sakala only three hours earlier. This transplantation was innovative medically. It was also interesting ethically because it prompted further discussions regarding the moral wisdom of using brain
dead or non~brain dead anencephalic human neonates as organ donors. The following exchange between Jacquelyn Bamman, a neonatologist from
Ventura, California and O. Ward Swarner, a neonatologist who is the chairman of the Ethics Committee at Loma Unda University Medical Center, highlights the issues that exist in today's legal context. The essay by James Walters, an ethicist at LLU who has been active in these debates for two years,
explores the ethical advantages and disadvantages of reversing current statutes so that anencephalic infants may be used as organ donors before
"whole brain" death is verified.

A Neonatologist's Concern
Gentlemen:
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I am very troubled by the recent surgery performed in your
institution where a heart from an anencephalic infant was
used in a transplant operation for a newborn with hypoplastic
left-heart syndrome. As a neonatologist, I understand very
well the desire to find some meaning in the existence of an
infant with anencephaly by donating a needed organ to
another infant who might thereby have a normal or near-normal life, but there are serious and controversial ethical and
legal issues.
The ethical issues raised in my mind relate to (1) subjecting
the anencephalic child to assisted ventilation, any other supportive measures needed to maintain optimal donor status,
and finally surgery, all clearly with no intent to benefit that
child; (2) directly causing the death of the anencephalic child
by surgically removing the heart; (3) the lack of any rational
way to prevent extension of this same approach to involve
other children with serious defects.
I realize there are arguments to support what was done. If
the child with anencephaly does not feel pain (I personally
don't know how much might be felt at the brain stem level),
then I.V.'s, intubation, suctioning, surgery, etc. might be acceptable if great benefit is obtained. I am not sure, however,
that we have the right to inflict invasive procedures on one individual, no matter how defective, strictly to provide benefit for
another individual.
I believe it is appropriate to withhold medical life-prolonging
support for infants with anencephaly because of their known
short life span, but I think that is a very different matter from
performing an act which of necessity results in the child's
death. I realize the issue of active versus passive euthanasia
also has legitimate arguments which can be made on both
sides.
I am very concerned, if this is considered to be a reasonable approach, about extension to other situations. If use as a
donor can be justified by the fact (that there is only a limited
life span;· will we extend this approach to infants who will
soon die with other problems such as Tay-Sachs, WerdnigHoffman disease, etc.? In some of these situations, you could
even argue that, unlike the anencephalic, there is benefit to
the donors because you are sparing them pain. If use as a
donor can be justified by the fact that the brain is severely abnormal, then will we extend this approach to the infants with
hydranencephaly, grade IV intracranial hemorrhage, Trisomy
13 and 18, etc.?
Finally, the anencephalic child does not meet the usual

criteria for a donor because that child is not legally brain
dead. As we are all well aware, the legal definition of brain
death includes absence of brain stem as well as cortical function.
I hope the ethical and legal issues involved were discussed
at length with both sets of parents. I realize there will be
widely divergent opinions on this issue, and that compassionate, honest and ethical analysis by different individuals will result in opposite views, but I think it all the more important for
that reason that everyone involved be well informed.
Jacquelyn Bamman, M.D.

A Neonatologist's Reply
Dear Dr. Bamman:

(

As the chairman of the Ethics Committee at Lorna Linda
University Medical Center, it is my pleasure to respond to
your thoughtfully written letter. You express concerns that
have occurred to us and I'm sure to many others wrestling
with these catastrophic problems.
I will address these issues in the order that you express
them as they pertain to this case.
1. The use of assisted ventilation and supportive treatment
is controversial in any critically ill child. The potential for benefit vs. harm is constantly on the mind of any neonatologist
caring for infants and children on ventilators. The major
reason that we used one is to keep the tissues well oxygenated and thereby to successfully accomplish the donation
wish of the parents. Pain and suffering didn't loom as a major
issue because the patient was already pronounced brain
dead.
2. The point at which this particular child died was long before the organ removal. She therefore experienced no pain or
discomfort during the preparation for the transplant. As is our
policy, the child was re-examined at Lorna Linda by child
neurologists and again determined to be brain dead before
any transplant could be considered. She was determined to
be legally dead by both local authorities and our criteria including no respiratory effort and CO2 > 60 mn.
3. You raised a third issue: ''the lack of any rational way to
prevent extension of this same approach to involve other chil-,
dren with serious defects." I hope you are satisfied that by ob
serving our protocol of using only children who are brain dead
we have a rational way to protect the patients whose fragile
lives are in our hands. We care greatly, as I'm sure you do,
for children with serious birth defects. There are no intentions

or justifications for putting some in jeopardy to harvest organs
for others. There is no intention to treat any child, no matter
how ill or compromised by birth defects, in ways other than
those which qualify legally and ethically according to the 80) ailed Baby Doe Guidelines.
Finally I wish to address the broader issue which you address: the possible use of non-brain dead infants with poor
prognosis as transplant donors. Our Ethics Committee in consultation with other concerned staff members, nurses, social
workers, ministers, and ethicists has met on numerous occasions to discuss this and related issues. We will continue to
follow with interest the publications from the Hastings Center,
Dr. Callahan, Dr. Kathleen Nolan and others. We are also
aware of proposals by some to change the law to make
anencephaly an exception to the brain death provision.
At this time we choose to reiterate our position as positive,
caring advocates for all children with birth defects. We remain
committed to doing all that we can in preventing and alleviating these disorders. But the Ethics Committee has not approved any harve~ting of organs . or procurement of transplants in any other than brain dead patients.
We respect the life of these patients no matter how clouded
the prognosis.
O. Ward Swarner, M.D.

Should. the Law
Be Changed?
by James Walters
Recent breakthroughs in cardiac surgical . technique for
newborns have only exacerbated an existing problem: the limited pool of transplantable neonatal hearts. An estimated
7,500 infants with life-threatening congenital heart defects are
annually born in this country. Of these, 650 newborns are
afflicted by hypoplastic left-heart syndrome, a universally fatal
condition until late successes in infant heart surgery and particularly in neonatal heart transplantation. Many of these · infants will die simply because of a limited cardiac donor pool.
In October of this year the first transplantation of an
anencephalic heart was performed at Loma Linda, heating up
a simmering debate on utilizing the anencephalic population
as organ donors. The discussion has two levels: first, the
question of morally appropriate care for anencephalics prior to
their death at which time their donor status is clear, and second, the question of whether state laws regarding determination of death should be changed to allow direct procurement
of anencephalic organs.
The intent of this essay is to critically marshal the pro's and
con's of the second question, the appropriateness of making
anencephalics a legal exception to the Uniform Determination
of Death Act, a "whole brain" death standard.

The Nature of Anencephaly
Anencephalic newborns are "born dying," as Paul Ramsey
puts it. In a study of over two million infants born in California
during a recent five-year period, 888 were anencephalic. Fifty,eight percent were born alive. Of these, approximately 65 perI ent died within 24 hours. An additional 30 percent died within the first week, while only two lived for approximately three
months!1
.
Anencephalics represent the nadir of handicapped infants.
Both cerebral hemispheres are missing, and there is little, if

any, brain function above the stem. The infants are grotesque: foreheads are absent, a mass of undeveloped brain tissue covered by membrane caps their upturned, shortened
heads, the eyeballs bulge from defective sockets, and the
ears sometimes touch the shoulders.
The incidence of anencephaly is 1 per 2,000 births on average in this country, although significant variations are likely
throughout various regions. Between two and three thousand
anencephalics are born annually, with the birth rate expected
to drop as the antenatal alpha fetoprotein screening program
for detecting neural tube defects is more widely adopted.
Are anencephalic newborns an acceptable source for neonatal transplantable hearts and other organs? From the medical pOint of view, the evidence is not all in. Specialists assumethat an anencephalic infant's organs are healthy and
appropriate for transplantions. But because there has been little demand for these babies' organs, little data exists on their
suitability. Medical science doesn't even understand the
cause of their early deaths, although respiratory failure is suspected.

Legal and Ethical Issues
The present legal status of anencephalic babies is
straightforward. All human infants born alive are registered as
citizens and receive Constitutional protection for their lives.
The willful taking of an anencepahlic baby's life would lay one
open to possible homicide charges, regardless of intent.
Anencephalic babies have no "higher" brain, but their brain
stem functions are intact, and hence they possess spontaneous respiration and circulation. They have good reflexes and
are not dissimilar to well babies in many primitive respects.
Ethically, the issue is anything but straightforward and bristles with questions: Would society's good be served by
anencephalic organ transplantation? Is such transplantation
right? Assuming that the transplantation is medically sound,
would it be defensible civil disobedience openly to break the
law to save the life of an infant dying for want of an available
anencephalic organ?
These issues are valid, but my focus is more narrow: Is it
ethically appropriate to make anencephalics an exception to
normal brain death criteria?
California Senator Milton Marks introduced Senate Bill 2018
in February of 1986 which called for amending the state's
Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) to include a
clause stating that "an individual born with the condition of
anencephaly is dead." Marks later modified the bill, proposing
that a state health advisory board examine the issue of severely handicapped newborns and make recommendations
regarding their treatment, the feasibility of infant organ transplants, and the acceptability of anencephalics as donors with
attention to the UDDA and possible "necessary changes.,,2
The idea of declaring anencephalics "dead" is perhaps ' ludicrous, but the larger issue of whether UDOA statutes should be
amended to allow for anencephalic organ procurement is important.

The Case Against Direct Anencephalic Organ
Procurement
An ethically substantive case exists for both sides of the
debate. First, J will develop three arguments against making
anencephalic infants an exception to current laws on brain
death.
1. Definition of death. Anencepahlic infants are not dead
according to current criteria. Although anencephalic infants
are without higher brain functions, their brain stem allows for
much typical newborn activity. Most importantly, circulatory
and respiratory functions are performed naturally. Crying,
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swallowing, and regurgitation occur. Infants with incomplete
anencephaly may have the mobility of a 4 month fetus. All infants respond to vestibular stimuli, and some to sound. Reflexes are usually strong, particularly their response to painful
stimuli. The grasp reflex is easily initiated. 3
2. Slippery slope. Declaring anencephalics to be functionally dead may initiate a slide down the "slippery slope." Paul
Ramsey advances this type of argument in regard to abortion,
and his principle applies analogically here: "Since we should
treat similar cases similarly, if x degree of defect would justify
abortion, the same x degrees of defect would with equal cogency justify infanticide.,,4 If anencepahlics are seen to have
marginal human life which today can be sacrificed for the
good of society, what other forms of human life might be utilized tomorrow for the supposed good of all? If anencephalics
are an e-xception, by what logic do we limit the exception to
this anomaly? Why not extend such reasoning to other handicapped infants, to those thought to have a future of suffering
which is even worse than death? And finally, why limit such
treatment to neonates?
3. Priority of law. Because the defining of death is such
an important issue, a clear and enforceable regulation is mandatory. This is true for two reasons:
First, individual patients need to be protected against any
premature decisions on their deaths. Hans Jonas, in the early
debates over organ transplants, argued for the "primary inviolability" of the individual patient, and for "the mandatory respect for invasion-proof selfhood." On the issue of defining
death he contended: "Since we do not know the borderline
between life and death, nothing less than the maximum definition of death will do - brain death plus heart death plus any
other indication that may be pertinent - before final violence
is allowed to be done."s
Second, society is best served by a public policy which unambiguously states its settled convictions on important matters. After much study and consultation with medical authorities, philosophers, theologians and others, the President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research settled on a "conservative" definition of brain death. The Commission consciously rejected a neocortical definition and chose a "whole

"Is it ethically appropriate to make anencephalies an exception to normal brain death
criteria?"
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brain" standard because the latter merely clarified "the understanding of death that enjoys near lIniversal acceptance in
our society." The Commission further explained; "On a matter
so fundamental to a society's sense of itself - touching
deeply held personal and religious beliefs - and so final for
the individuals involved, one should desire much greater consensus than now exists before taking the major step of radically revising the concept of death.,,6
Good law embodies and carefully articulates society's
deepest sense of right behavior.: Further, good law defines
basic functional boundaries which give life its public meaning
and within which life can flourish. We now appropriately reject
many of the taboos of primitive communities as superstitious,
but·.such taboos promoted vital social integration. Today, a
reasonably derived consensus on regulations concerning life
and death is essential to us if the social fabric of the land is
to remain strong.
Admittedly, the giving of priority to social integration limits
individual autonomy. But the well-being of society rightly does
take precedence over strictly individual hardship cases. Law

written from the basis of hard cases makes for poor law. Ethical action, in certain difficult cases, may demand the courage
to engage in public civil disobedience, but for compelling social reasons, the law may be proper. For example, laws ~
against aiding and abetting suicide protect society's high valu·
ation of human life. Nevertheless, it is correctly argued that such laws may place an undue burden upon terminally ill persons who unbearably suffer and. desire aid in ending their ·
lives. The rights and needs of autonomous ·individuals are finally bounded by and to be perceived in light of the collective
good.
The Case For Direct Anencephalic Organ Procurement
Although the above arguments are powerful, four strong arguments can be made in favor of making anencephaly an exception to our current definition of death.
1. Best interests. The best interests of anencephalic newborns are not served by sustaining them until their natural
deaths. In fact, given the condition of anencephalics, whether
the concept of "best interests" applies is questionable. Society
may see its own interests served by providing basic care for
anencephalic babies, but this should not be confused with the
anencephalics' best interests. Regardless, the President's
Commission views the best interests test as the primary standard for deciding treatment or non-treatment for highly compromised neonates, and anencephalics do not meet the
criteria of this standard.
2. ConSistency. Terminally and seriously ill adults have
recently won court cases which sustain their right to forego
life-sustaining treatment. Such a right is much less sure for
similarly situated neonates. An important document was issued last year by the Los Angeles County Medical Association and the Los Angeles County Bar Association. Based on
recent California Second District Court of Appeals decisionE
on the Barber and Bartling cases, the document stated that "It
is the right of every adult person . .. to make his or her own
decision regarding medical care ... even when such a decision might result in shortening the individual's life." It also
stated that the same right to forego medical treatment belongs to the incompetent adult patient through an appropriate
surrogate.
Ironically, the Department of Health and Human Services'
Baby Doe regulations point in the opposite direction. It stipulates that even babies whose conditions indicate the withholding of exotic medical treatment, must still receive "appropriate
nutrition, hydration, and medication." Just as some courts now
allow gravely ill adults to forego all treatment, for the sake of
consistency we must extend this humane provision to severely handicapped neonates through their surrogates.
Because anencephalic infants are devoid of the potential
for any uniquely human brain functions, state law should declare that usual brain death criteria are irrelevant in these
cases. Parents should have the option of donating the organs
of their anencephalic infants at any time.
3. Life-saving. It would be wrong, obviously, to use
anencephalic organs for transplantation if the organs serve
their host's best interests. But they don't, and the organs
could be used to save other infants' lives. Although the interests of the primary patient are most important, when those interests are no longer served or never existed, the ulterior use
of the host's organs assumes major importance. Many babies
with severe congenital heart defects will die unless a source
of suitable hearts is found, and it appears today that anence
pahlic newborns are an excellent source. Further, a number
of parents of anencephalic newborns desperately desire that
at least some good for another sick baby might come from
their own personal tragedy.

4. Apt laws. National laws provide the moral framework
upon which a people's social fabric is stretched. To maintain
this role, laws need modification as presupposed conditions
x.hange. In the context of severely handicapped newborns, as
ledical technology is capable of sustaining increasingly marginal life, we must reevaluate laws designed to safeguard
human life in light of affected babies. Laws designed to
further personal well-being are ill-served if used merely to
protect human life which is now known to be absent any personal potential.
The ability of physicians to certify death in a patient has
evolved since the eighteenth century, and the law has
changed accordingly. During the 18th century, macabre incidents of "corpses" reviving during funerals and exhumed
skeletons found to have clawed at coffin lids led to widespread distrust of physicians who were limited to such diagnostic techniques as checking for fixed pupils and feeling for
the pulse. By the mid 19th century the stethoscope had been
discovered and medical science came to a consensus that
cessation of circulation and respiration constituted death. This
criteria was reflected in common law as recorded by Black's

"Are anencephalic newborns an acceptable
source for badly needed neonatal transplantable
hearts and other organs? From the medical
point of view, the evidence is not all in."

Law Dictionary up through the 1968 edition. Previously, lifesustaining technology had so developed that precise criteria
were needed to know when to replace appropriate care for
'I-)e living with respectful handling of the dead body. This compelling need led to the landmark Harvard criteria on brain
death, a series of tests which were so reliable that no individual has met the criteria and later regained brain functions.
However, many patients died without meeting all the Harvard
criteria, and due to advances in diagnostic skills a more restricted definition of death was recommended by the President's Commission, and hence the widely accepted UDDA. It
simply states that one of two criteria must be met for death to
be certified: 1) cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, and 2) irreversible cessation of all brain functions, including those of the brain stem.
The Death Act actually breaks no new ground beyond the
Harvard criteria. The Harvard criteria didn't change the customary definitions of death based upon spontaneous circulation and respiration. But it did provide superior procedures for
determining death.
A good case can be made that society has no need to
further refine the definition of death. However, the time has
come for society to consider the appropriateness of updating
the medical criteria for organ donation. Specifically, the issue
is whether brain stem death must necessarily be present before organ donations are allowed. The certified death of the
neocortex would be sufficient for many persons in regard to
donation of their own organs, and a ~trong argument could be
made in defense of this position.
A fully developed argument for this position is beyond the
context of this essay, but the argument could develop society's growJng recognition of the patient's autonomous control
,over. his or her own body. Also, an analogy could be made to
ahe American Medical Association's determination that it is
ethically permissible for all treatment - including IV nutrition - to be withdrawn from the permanently comatose. If
families may choose to let loved ones "starve," those same
comatose individuals should be able to donate the vital or-

gans of their vegetating bodies if they have so chosen in an
earlier lucid judgment.
Similarly, if terminally and seriously ill patients have the
right to forego life-sustaining treatment, they should have the
right of organ donation according to personal specifications
which may be realized sooner than brain stem death. Adults
should be able to decide that once their higher brain functions
are irreversibly lost, their organs may be transplanted. In the
case of incompetent adults a duly designated surrogate may
now decide on the foregoing of life-sustaining treatment, and
by logical extension a surrogate should be able to implement
the patient's intentions on organ donation. Severely handicapped neonates whose neocortex is dead or absent would also
be suitable as organ donors if their deSignated surrogates,
normally their parents, so decide.
In this broader line of reasoning, transplantation of anence,phalic infants' hearts is but the most obvious instance of a
situation in which parents might properly consent to organ donation before "whole brain" death occurs.

Which Ethical Rationale Is Right?
Determination of which rationale - that in favor of or that
opposed to direct anencephalic organ procurement - is more
persuasive depends on exactly what question is being asked .
Is the question one of individual ethics or of social ethics? If
the question remains in the arena of individual ethics and
concerns the confined ethical question of the impaired infant's
intrinsic worth, the direct utilization of anencephalic organs
before the determination of "whole brain" death may be commendable.
Imagine, for example, that a pediatric heart surgeon skilled
in transplantation were on a small Pacific island with two
dying babies - an anencephalic and a hypoplastic left-heart
infant. The latter baby would be dead within hours unless the
transplantable heart were immediately procured from the
anencephalic baby. The physician's decision possesses no
implications beyond the island. Many would agree that the
transplant operation is not only morally permissible but obligatory.
However, transplant surgeons don't live on isolated islands.
Ethics which focuses on the individual is vital, but an ethics
which fails to take broad societal sensibilities into account is
inadequate. Society is increasingly pluralistic, and this plurality must be respected for the good of all. Although this need
not mean an ethics of the lowest common denominator, it
does indicate the need to proceed openly and deliberately in
areas of moral controversy.

"If anencephalies are seen to have marginal
human life today which can be sacrificed for the
good of society, what other forms of human life
might be utilized tomorrow for th~ supposed
good of all?"

Technoiogy wili increasingiy force society to grapple with
the difference between prolongation of merely genetically
human individuals and treatment of individuals who possess,
or who are capable of attaining or regaining, self-awareness.
If' SOCiety moves toward the latter, the individual merits of direct anencepahlic organ procurement may be , realized. But
SOCiety today is clearly a composite: some holding to a personality based definition of human value, others to a biological definition, and most of us intuitively drawn toward features
of both.
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Before statute law on brain death is changed to allow for
anencephalic exceptions, widespread discussion and debate
is imperative. Otherwise, several hundred additional newborns
may be saved for a society racked by a controversy which
dwarfs the present abortion standoff. A number of neonatal
lives could be rescued, but the social good would not be wellserved by a rapid liberalizing of present brain death criteria
for organ procurement.
1. Jeffrey J. Pomerance and Barry S. Schifrin, "Life Expectancy of the
Anencephalic Infant and Its Relationship to the 'Baby Doe' Regulations," an unpublished manuscript, pp.4, 5.
2. See Alexander Morgan Capron, "Anencephalic Donors: Separate
the Dead from the Dying," Hastings Center Report 17 (February,
1987), pp.5-9, for insightful, critical analysis of Senator Marks' bill and
related issues.
3. Kenneth R. Swaiman and Francis S. Wright, The Practice of
Pediatric Neurology, Vol. 1 (St. Louis: The C. V. Mosby Co., 1982),
p.410.
4. Paul Ramsey, Ethics at the Edges of Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), p.190.
5. See Paul Ramsey, Patient as Person (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970), pp.108-110.
6. President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems , in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Defining Death
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), pp.36,
41.

Would Anencephalic
Neonates Be Citizens?
by David Larson
Professor Walters' helpful essay concludes that the laws of
our land should not now be changed so as to permit the removal of organs from anencephalic human infants before
"whole brain" death is verified. The feather that tips the balance toward ~his judgment is his concern that such legal
changes mig~t erode "social integration" even more profoundly than Floe vs. Wade has. In the final analysis, his argument is neither that earlier removal of organs from anencepahlic neonates would wrong these or other donors" nor that
such procedures would degrade the community by making us
all more calloused toward vulnerable members of our own
species, but that the resulting civic debates would be intolerably disruptive.
This conclusion is sobering and perplexing. How discordant
would these public disagreements actually be? How long
would they last? How many would they involve? What would
be their results? No one knows for sure, though pollsters

"To visitors, what we take for granted must
seem legally perplexing and -ethically ghastly."
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could be retained to develop some preliminary hints. But what
would such findings prove? Are there not some moral stands
persons and professionals should take even if such ethical
unconventionality does threaten social integration? Of course!
And Walters agrees. But he does not think this issue merits
such moral stridency. And I agree with his assessment of our
proper priorities.

But since the issue is now before us, let us ask the ultimate
question: as a matter of ethical prinCiple, would a morally
wise SOCiety extend to anencephalic human neonates the
rights and privileges it rightly accords to all citizens irreSpec-(
tive of race, religion, gender, health, region, wealth, or political persuasion? I doubt it. Such infants would not be regarded as citizens because they do not possess, never did

"Would a morally wise society extend to anencephalic human neonates the rights and privileges
it accords to all citizens?"

possess, and never will possess even the shadow of the capacity to be selves. This is the ethically decisive consideration. Other factors are also relevant and important, but less
so.
A morally wise society would have laws that provide greater
protection to all human selves, as well as to all prospective
and retrospective human selves, than they would furnish
homo sapiens who are unquestionably, irredeemably and permanently self-less by every conceivable medical and moral
measure.
But our society is not yet that wise. Its laws permit the
deliberate prenatal termination of thousands of normal and
healthy prospective persons every year while at the very
same time these laws require us at great expense to sustain
thousands of homo sapiens for whom selfhood never was
and never will be even a remote possibility. To tourists in the
land of the free and the home of the brave, what we now take
for granted must seem legally perplexing and ethically '
ghastly.

Cadaveric Donors
Should Be Dead
by Gerald Winslow
James Walters reminds us that our laws do not allow taking
organs from anencephalic babies who are capable of breathing spontaneously and responding to painful stimuli. By our
most widely accepted definition of death, such babies are not
"dead." We are not legally permitted to use them as sources
of cadaveric organs before they are deceased ~ a truth both
legal 'and analytic.
Perhaps the time has come for us to change our definitions
and our laws . so that they reflect a more mature ethics, one
willing to harvest the organs of those who will never achieve
personhood for the sake of those who probably will be persons. Before we change, however, we should wonder.
In this, Walters helps us by questioning the effect of such
changes on our society. The potential for social strife, he concludes, is so daunting that society is not ready, just now, for
the "direct" procurement of anencephalics' organs. ("Direct"
refers, I take it, to taking organs from anencephalics not yet
dead by current standards.)
There is more to wonder about. If we can finesse the problem of taking organs "directly" from anencephalics by declaring them "dead," even though they may be capable of breath-

ing spontaneously, grasping objects, crying, and responding
to painful stimuli, would we not be creating a whole new class
of individuals whose membership could hardly be limited to
anencephalics? What are the relevant differences between
) such anencephalics and other individuals (e.g., hydranencephalics or those in persistent vegetative state) w!th similarly
poor prospects for achieving or regaining personal life? Are
there logically sound ways of avoiding the slippery slope to
which these questions point?
If, with less finesse but probably greater honesty, we admit
that the "direct" procurement of anencephalics' organs means
taking organs from living infants, are we prepared to defend
actions that result in the termination of some human lives,
however pitiful, for the sake O'f other humail lives, however
promising? What would be the likely results of such actions
on society's collective conscience, including the willingness to
donate organs?
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The intent of such questions is not to suggest that procurement of organs from anencepahlics is always wrong. What is

"Are we prepared to defend actions that result
'i n the termination of some human lives, however
pitiful, for the sake of other human lives, however promising?"

needed, in my view, is the assurance that organs are procured from the truly dead and not jrorn the dying. CUirent efforts to achieve greater clarity and certainty about the time of
death appear promising. We should hope that parents of any
anencephalic will be able, if they choose, to consent to the
donation of their infant's organs, after the baby has died.

Dear Friends:
Once again, the Center needs your help!
We are now soliciting $100,000 to finance the current activities and plans of
LLU's Center for Christian Bioethics. The members of our Board of Directors have
pledged $35,000 before December 31 for the perpetual endowment. An additional
$65,000 is needed to fund this year's projects by supplementing the investment income the endowments will yield.
During fiscal year '86·'87 206 individuals or institutions contributed to the Center
a total of $116,425.26. The smallest gift was $5. The largest was $30,000. The average was $565. But every penny helped!
Under the leadership of Jack Provonsha, our Board of Directors voted a budget
for the current year on September 25. The expenses anticipated in this budget fall
into four categories. Forty percent of the total is allocated for wages, benefits and
honoraria for guest lecturers. Twenty-five percent is earmarked for library acquisitions, a vital first step in the long journey of developing a first-rate collection.
Twenty percent will be spent printing Update and mailing it without charge to
10,000 persons, about half of whom are graduates of LLU's schools of medicine
and dentistry. And fifteen percent will be spent on office supplies and expenses.
The income needed to cover these expenses will come from interest produced by
the Center's perpetual endowment plus additional contributions. So your gift, large
or small, is genuinely needed, as are your prayers and good will!
Will you help the Center this year?
'T hank you for considering this request!
Cordially,

David R. Larson
Director
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